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The following estimates of regional, territorial, and sectoral 
gains and losses resulting from East African economic union are 
presented as app: ximcttions indicating orders of magnitude not precise 
calculations. The assumptions used in obtaining them are indicated 
in the notes to individual tables * These estimates seek to consolidate 
the various partial calculations of gains and losses which have been 
attempted" and to escape from the balance of interterritorial trade 
based approach which almost inevitably results in estimating only-
transfer gains and losses between territories, without taking account 
of the net gains to East Africa as a region which are the justification 
for economic union- They are intended to serve five purposes: 
1. To provide a picture of total regional gains and their source; 
2. To provide a parallel picture of the territorial divisions of 
gains (losses) both overall and divided between public and 
private sectors; 
3- To supply a quantitative basis for evaluating contentions about 
the results of the economic union and their relative 
importance; 
To illustrate the impact of different structures of production 
- at least partly the result of economic union - on 
territorial growth rates; 
5. To demonstrate the possibility and hopefully the value of more 
detailed calculations by an impartial, official body with 
fuller access to statistical data and greater resources. 
With -che exception of the table illustrating the differential 
effects of production structures on growth rates, all of the cal-
culations concern static gains and losses. They are based on the 
following assumptions: 
1. That the alternative to economic union in the common market 
field would be three protected national markets not extra-
regional importation of present interterritorial imports. 
This assumption means that "tariff revenue loss" calculations 
are irrelevant; 
2. That in the service field the same levels of services would be 
provided on a national basis with the exception of the inter-
national. operations of East African Airways which would be 
utterly unviable as three competing national units. 
The conclusion that present breakup of economic union would lead 
to immediate territorial gains and losses as indicated is not valid. 
Substantial time and capital would be required to relocate production and 
service facilities- In the short run the regional and territorial 
costs of breakup would be substantially larger than present net 
regional gains* 
* Among the more interesting of these are - W. Newlyn, "Gains'and 
Losses in the East African Common Market", op cit; A. Hazlewood, 
"Economic Integration in East Africa", International Seminar on 
Economic Co-operation in Africa, Nairobi, December, 1965 and "The 
x'orri + orial Incidence of the East African Common Services" in Oxford 
University Institute of Statistics Bulletin August, 1965; D.G.R. Belshaw, 
"Agricultural Production and Trade in the East African Common Market", 
op cit; and D. Ghai "Territorial Distribution of Benefits and Costs 
in the East African Common Market", op cit. Professor Newlyn''s paper 
directly stimulated the present, attempt bo achieve at least approxi-
mate quantitative data or. the overall level and distribution of gains 
from Ec- '"• AiY.'.oaii ^ ornonic unxon
2 . 
Several important conclusions do emerge from the data: 
1. The overall East African static gain, while not negligible, is 
only 1.7% of regional product. The basic reason for this is 
the limited number of industries which are regional market 
dependent as opposed to shiftable. 
2. Substantial large scale industrial development in East Africa 
would radically increase the net regional gain and could - if 
appropriately distributed - reduce the inequality in territorial 
distribution. On the other hand if the present industrial 
location pattern were to continue, the inequality of distribution 
would increase absolutely and probably relatively. 
3. All three states are substantial gainers on government sector 
account when cost savings and tax receipts are taken together. 
Only Kenya is a substantial gainer on private sector account, while 
Tanzania is a substantial loser. 
5. Overall Kenya has a substantial (3-4% of GDP) net gain, Uganda a 
marginal (1.3% of GDP)net gain, and Tanzania a marginal (some-
what under 1% of GDP) net loss. 
6. The services sector fails to redress common market gains in-
equalities, because transfer effects resulting from location of 
facilities make Kenya the largest net gainer. Tanzania is a 
net gainer on services, Uganda breaks even. 
7. The Raisman transfer effect - while by no means insignificant -
is not adequate to provide net gains to all three territories, 
much less an approximately equal division of net regional 
benefits. 
Uganda's net gain is dependent on the sale of textiles, sugar, 
tobacco, cotton-seed, oil, and electric power to Kenya. Kenyan 
self sufficiency in sugar, textiles and power would convert the 
gain to a loss of at least equal magnitude. 
9. Tanzania has achieved a significant stake in regional market 
dependent industry, although not one large enough to offset 
losses on shiftable industry income effects. This stake will 
increase when the tyre and tube and radio assembly plants 
scheduled under the Kampala/Mbala Agreements come into production. 
All calculations have been made from national or EACSO published 
statistics when available and from unofficial estimates in other 
cases unle ss specifically noted to the contrary. 1964 has been used 
as a base year with minor adjustments in cases for which 1964 trade 
patterns were markedly typical. 
The net gains from the industrial common market are probably 
underestimated. Existing industrial statistics have very broad 
classifications which may result in some plants dependent on regional 
markets appearing to be part of multi-plant shiftable industries. 
Corrections for this factor would appear most unlikely to alter the 
overall regional or territorial gains (losses) from the industrial 
common market by more than 10-15%. 
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I. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
SERVICES (2) (All figures in £000) 
TANZANIA(l) ; KENYA " UGANDA j l EAST AFRICA 
Railroad and Harbour 
i i i i 
! 
Main Line Losses 
Diversion of Traffic 
from Moshi-Arusha to ' 
Mombasa and from 
Tanga 
Operating Expense 
Savings (10%) 
i +1000 
-5C0 
6 0 0 
-500 j 
i 
| 
+250 ' 
6 0 0 j 
-500 
+250 
6 0 0 1800 
Workshop Expense 
Savings (10%) 100 
) 
100 1 J 1 
100 3 0 0 
Income Effect of Central-
ization: Headquarters 
(3) Workshop 
-100 
-625 
j 
+200 S 
+1250 | 
-100 
- 6 2 5 
-
TOTAL RAIL AND HARBOUR +475 +1900 i -275 + 2100 
Airline 
t j 
1 
Territorial/Interritorial 
(4) Losses 
Profits 
Net Effect Consolidation 
325 
125 
+200 
1 1 
275 i 
-275 j 1 
125 
50 Z 
Overseas Operations 
(3) Profit 
Income Effect 
200 
100 
2 0 0 
2 0 0 1 
200 
100 
600 
400 
Internal Operation 
(6) Expense Savings 15%> 240 
j 
210 | 150 6 o o 
TOTAL AIRLINE +740 
J 1 
+335! +525 + 1 6 0 0 
Posts and Telegraph i 
Territories Losses 
Current Cost Savings (?) 
(10%) 
250 
280 . 
-200 • 
320 
-50 
200 8 0 0 
TOTAL POST AND TELEGRAPH +530 +120 +150 + 8 0 0 
EACSO 
Services Cost Savings (8) 
Income Effect of Central-
ization of Operations (9) 
350 
-1000 
350 
+2200 
350 
-1200 
1 0 5 0 
TOTAL EACSO - 6 5 0 +2550 -850 + 1 0 5 0 
Hydroelectric Power 
Income Effect (10) 
Cost Savings (11) 
- -400 
250 
+400 
2 5 0 
TOTAL POWER -150 +400 + 2 5 0 
SERVICES GAINS & LOSSES 
(11) + 1 0 9 5 +4755 -50 + 5 8 0 0 
SPILLOVER EFFECT (13) 1 1 5 -345 190 -40 
TOTAL SERVICE SECTOR GAINS 1210 ! 4^10 i4o 5760 
4„ 
TANZANIA KENYA UGANDA EAST AFRICA 
GOVERNMENT COST/REVENUE EFFECTS 
(l4) 
Cost Savings 2520 855 1175 k550 
Airline Profits 200 ' 200 200 600 
Power Sales - -150 '+00 250 
Effect on Tax Revenues 
of Income Transfers 
(20%) (15) 
and Net Additions -305 700 -325 70 
GOVERNMENT GAINS 2415 1605 1^50 5470 
PRIVATE SECTOR GAINS/LOSSES • . 
(16) - 205 2805 -1310 290 
NOTES 
1. Tanzania with the exception of certain EACSO services, refers to 
Tanganyika only. Zanzibar is not a member of the Common Market 
nor does it participate in the self-contained services. 
2. Railway and Harbour, airline and post and telegraph data represent 
"Educated guesses" based on regional data and unofficial statements 
on territorial breakdowns. No official territorial cost and ^ 
revenue data are available. CF somewhat different ."educated 
guesses" by A. HazleTn?ood, op cit, p. 24. 
3- Additional incomes generated are estimated at 1.67 times 
Headquarters Expenses (perhaps £120,000) plus Workshop Value 
Added (25% of £3,000,000 gross output). The transfer is com-
puted as the difference between a 33_33_33 division and the 
present 0-100-0 distribution. 
4. Losses are sustained on intraterritorial flights in Tanzania, and 
Uganda and on the Entebbe-Dar service. Profits are earned on 
the Nairobi-Mombasa, Nairobi-Dar and Nairobi-Entebbe runs. 
The 1964 EAA report suggests that these profits and losses 
approximately net out and that/the overall net profit of £600,000 
is totally derived from international flights. 
5. The alternative to one international airline is assumed to be none. 
The gain from joint operation is, therefore, the net profit plus 
the income generated by regional component of expenditure on 
behalf of international services. This is very roughly set at 
£200,000 divided 23-30-23 with an income multiplier of 2. 
6. It is assumed that roughly. c-5 of total costs are incurred for 
intra and inter territorial services three territorial airlines 
would continue to operate. The savings rate of 15% is divided 
35% (T), k0% (K), 25% (U) on estimate of share in these flights. 
7. Savings divided ^5% (T), kO% (K), 25% (U) on estimate of 
expenditure pattern. 
8. Estimated at 10% on Social and Ancillary Services, 20% on 
Administration, 25% on Economic Services. The cost contribution 
transfer effects of Union are considered in anal ,v='1'« 2oisman 
formula effects. 
5 . 
9. The income effect is estimated as 2 times the difference between 
local expenditure incurred on behalf of a state and expenditure 
in that state. The difference is computed from the data in 
A. Hazlewood, op cit, P. 22 with adjustments for expenditures 
outside East Africa on behalf of each state, i.e. £500,000 of 
services to_ Tanzania and £600,000 of services tci Uganda are 
carried on in Kenya and have their income effects there. 
10. The income effect is treated as equal to net sales. This 
assumes Uganda has insignificant additional current expenditures 
from generating the power and uses the revenue to meet external 
obligations of the UEB. 
11. The UEB charges Kenya approximately 60% (per unit) of its average 
internal rate for power. Kenyan generation costs would appear 
for substitute power to be at least equal to the Ugandan internal 
tariffs. 
12. Cost reductions are treated as additions to real domestic 
product throughout. 
13. Spillover effect results from the propensity to spend additions 
to domestic income on products of the other territories. It is 
here computed 011 transfer and net income effects only, not on 
cost savings, airline profits, or power sales. The estimated 
spillover gains are: 
Tanzania 3% of additions to Kenyan income Negligible re 
Uganda 
Kenya 10% of additions to Tanzanian income 10% of additions 
to Ugandan income, 
Uganda 3% of additions to Kenyan income Negligible re 
Tanzania. 
14. Airline profits (but not income effects) and UEB power sales are 
here included in the Government Sector. 
15. Average territorial .tax revenue slightly exceeds 20% of Gross 
Monetary Product. Marginal tax revenue from additional Gross 
Monetary Product tends to be below the' average rate. However, 
the Union economic sectors appear to bear a somewhat above 
typical tax incidence. A 20% marginal rate is, therefore, used. 
This rate is applied to net and transfer income effects but not 
to cost savings, airline profits, or UEB sales. 
16. Strictly speaking this sector is Private plus Autonomous Public 
Corporations not specifically included in the Government Sector. 
For purposes of the present analysis this lumping has no serious 
detrimental effects and the isolation of the impact of Union on 
individual autonomous corporation profits would be virtually 
impossible. 
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II. COMMON MARKET 
Industrial 
B.. 
C. 
• A. 
B. 
(£000) 
TANZANIA i KENYA UGANDA EAST AFRICA 
A. Inter-territorial Trade in "Shiftable" (National Market) Industries 
Income Effect (1) 
Tanzania Exports 
Kenya Exports 
Uganda Exports 
1 0 0 0 
- 6 5 0 0 
- 1 2 0 0 
-700 
1 3 3 0 0 
- 2 9 0 0 
- 3 0 0 
-7000 
4100 
Cost Savings of Present 
Location (2) 770 3 6 0 7 3 0 1 8 6 0 
TOTAL A -5930 1 0 2 6 0 -2470 1 8 6 0 
Regional Market Industries Not Viable on National Basis 
Tanzania (3) 
TOTAL- A AND B 
Spillover Effects (4) 
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL 
1200 j - 1200 
-^730 ! 10260 -2^70 3060 J 
310 | -720 515 105 
-4420 1 9540 -1955 3165 
Selected Foods, Agricultural Raw Materials (5) 
Inter-territorial Trade in Shiftable Production. 
Income Effect (6) 
Tanzania Exports 
Kenya Exports 
Uganda Exports 
Cost Savings of Present 
Location (7) 
TOTAL A 
1605 - l l 4 o - 4 7 0 
-1300 2290 -995 
-430 -4570 5005 
190 635 160 
70 - 2 7 8 5 3705 
Non-Shiftable Component of Interterritorial Trade 
i 
Income-Effect (8) 
Tanzania Exports 
Kenya Exports 
Uganda Exports 
160 
-95 
-30 
-85^ 
230 
-340 
-35 
-75 
500 
40 
60 
125 
. TOTAL B 1030 -195 390 225 
TOTAL A AND B 100 - 2 9 8 0 4095 1215 
C. Spillover Effect (9) - 9 0 420 -150 180 
TOTAL FOODS, AGRICULTURAL RAW 
MATERIALS 10 -2560 3945 1395 
TOTAL COMMON MARKET GAINS/LOSSES -4410 6 9 8 O 1990 4560 
GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
Tax Revenue 20% (10) -880 1390 400 910 
PRIVATE SECTOR (11) -3530 5590 1590 3 6 5 0 
990 
990 
7 . 
NOTES 
1. Shiftable industries are those in which viable plant size (typical 
East African plant) is below national market demand. The income 
effect from exports is calculated at 2 times industrial value 
added plus raw material production (e.g. for dairying, flour 
milling) dependent on industry; dairy and meat products are 
included in the industrial sector in these estimations. The 
capital employed in founding these industries is assumed to 
have been foreign or regionally mobile - East African in origin 
while expansion is believed to have come basically from re-
invested profits. 
2. Cost savings from present - as opposed to three separate terri-
torial market location patterns are estimated at 20% of the 
adjusted value added of shiftable industry imports. This is, 
if there were three separate markets with tariff barriers against 
each other, selling prices of manufactured goods now imported 
from other territories would be higher because of higher costs. 
3. Bata Shoe (plastic shoes), blanket factory, aluminium product 
plant. Income effect 2 times total value added. 
See I - Note 13. Computed on A plus B. 
5. Sugar, tobacco (unmanufactured), Maize and Millet, Wheat,, Vegetable 
Oils, Animal Foodstuffs. 
6. 80% of interritorial trade is taken as shiftable production. The 
value added ratio is taken as 90%. A multiplier of 2 is used. 
7. Cost savings from present location pattern are estimated at 20% 
of shiftable imports. 
8. The 
non—shiftable component of 20% is taken to be the share of 
products physically not produceable in the importing territory 
(e.g. lack of land, unsuitable climate) or produceable only at 
30% or more additional cost. The same 90% value added ratio 
and multiplier of 2 are used. 
The base gain to the exporting state is, however, assumed to be 
the difference between territorial proceeds and world market 
proceeds (less transport costs) estimated at 40% of non-
shiftable exports. The base cost to the importing state is 
taken to be the difference between the East African cost and 
the world cost (including additional transport) taken at 30% 
of non-shiftable imports. 
In this case the alternative to production for the Regional 
market is production for the world market and the alternative 
to Regional imports, world market imports. 
9. See I - Note 13. Computed on A plus B. 
10. See I - Note 15. 
11. See I - Note 16. 
Rounding 
In Industrial A and B income effects have been rounded to the 
nearest 100 because of the extreme difficulty in making precise 
estimates of adjusted value added. Cost savings have been rounded 
8 / . . . 
8 . 
to the nearest 10. Spillover effects have been rounded to the nearest 
5. In Foods and Agricultural Raw Materials all figures have been 
rounded to the nearest 5* 
Comment: 
The extremely limited number of Regional Market (Non-Shiftable) 
industries is a priori suspicious. However, the bulk of East African 
interterritorial trade is, in fact, in goods produced in clearly shif-
table industries. Adjustments from the Shiftable to Regional Market 
category resulting from a more detailed set of industrial classes would 
be positive but probably involving about 5% of interterritorial 
industrial trade as a maximum. 
Nytil (Uganda) was formerly in the Regional Market category but 
this is no longer the case especially as a substantial portion of 
Nytil's cloth exports to Kenya return to Uganda as finished clothing 
and this clothing industry segment is clearly shiftable. 
III. RAISMAN FORMULA TRANSFER EFFECTS (1) (£000) 
TANZANIA KENYA UGANDA EAST AFRICA 
A. Direct Fiscal Transfer 
Effect (2) 305 -550 245 
* 
B. EACSO Cost Redistri-
bution (3) 1 8 0 -215 35 
• 
DIRECT TRANSFER EFFECT 485 -765 2 8 0 -
C. Multiplier Income 
Effect (4) 485 -765 2 8 0 -
D. Spillover Effect 
(On A, B, C) (5) -45 155 -75 35 
TOTAL RAISMAN FORMULA EFFECT 925 -1375 485 35 
GOVERNMENT COST/REVENUE EFFECTS 
Direct Transfer Effect 
Tax Revenue Effect -
Multiplier and Spill-
Over Incomes (20%) (6) 
485 
' 88 
-765 
-122 
2 8 0 
41 7 
GOVERNMENT GAINS/LOSSES 573 -887 321 7 
PRIVATE SECTOR GAINS/LOSSES 
(7) 
— — — . — 
352 -^88 164 28 
NOTES: 
1. Based on 1964-65 estimates. Calculations A, B, C, D rounded to 
nearest 5- For alternative calculations (re B) of A. Hazlewood, 
op cit, pp. 18-19. 
2. Difference between half payment into Distributable Pool and 
receipts from Pool (1/6 of DP)-. 
9 / . . . 
9 . 
3. Difference between half payment into Distributable Fool (the 
share paid to EACSO) and share of EACSO services benefiting 
territory. EACSO benefit calculation (from A Hazlewood, op 
cit, p. 22, benefit distribution data) is 29% (T), 45% (K) 
26% (U). Assumption is that in absence of pool each territory 
would bear full cost of its share. Alternative assumption of 
33-33-33 contribution equal in total to distributable pool 
would make B 303 (T), -5.4? (K) , 243 (U) but this appears an 
unrealistic way to compute present territorial gains from pool. 
4. It is assumed that the net additions to (including substractions 
and EACSO cost reductions or increases) government funds available 
are expended and generate an equal multiplier income in private 
sector. 
5. See I - Note 13. 
6. See I - Note 15. 
7. See I - Note 16. 
IV. COMBINED BALANCE SHEET - STATIC GAINS AND LOSSES FROM ECONOMIC UNION 
(£000) 
TANZANIA KENYA UGANDA ;EAST AFRICA. 
i 
I. Services 1216 4410 140 5760 
II. Common Market -4410 6980 1990 4560 
III. Raisman Formula 925 -1375 485 1 35 
GRAND TOTAL STATIC GAINS/LOSSES-2275 10015 2615 
1 
10355 
% of GDP - .9 3.6 1.3 1.4 
(244,000) (278,000)1(203,000) (725,000) 
GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
I. Services 2415 1605 1450 5 4 7 0 
II. Common Market -880 1390 400 9 1 0 
III. Raisman Formula 573 -887 321 7 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT SECTOR 2108 2108 2171 6 3 8 7 
PRIVATE SECTOR (1) 
I. Services -1205 2805 -1310 290 
II. Common Market -3530 5590 1590 3650 
III. Raisman Formula 352 -488 164 28 
TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR -3483 7907 444 | i 3968 
NOTES: 
1. See I - Note l6„ 
10/. 
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V. IMPACT OF DIFFERENTIAL INITIAL STRUCTURES OF PRODUCTION ON 
TERRITORIAL GROWTH RATES 
A. Initial (1964) Structures of Production (%) 
TANZANIA KENYA UGANDA EAST AFRICA 
61.2 42.2 67.3 55.9 
2.4 9.6 3.9 5.7 
3-1 1.6 1.8 2.0 
16.4 23.2 13-6 18.2 
3.5 8.1 6.9 6.2 
2.1 3.k 2.0 2.6 
11.3 11.8 4.5 9.6 
Primary and Mining (1) 
Manufacturing (2) 
Construction 
Trade-Transport-Power 
Services 
Rents 
General Government 
B. Sectoral Growth Rates Consistent with 6.5% Annual Growth of East 
African Output. 
Primary and Mining 5% 
Manufacturing 12% 
Construction 15% 
Trade-Transport-Power 8% 
Services 5% 
Rents 8% 
General Government 8% 
TOTAL GDP 6.5% 
Growth 
C. Resultant National., Rates if Sectoral Imbalances within Region 
Persist on present lines and each State sustains an equal level 
of Effort toward growth. 
Tanzania (3) 6.4% 
Kenya 6.9% 
Uganda 6.1% 
East Africa 6.5% 
D. Annual Gain or Loss from differential growth effects of structure 
of Production (4) 
Tanzania Loss .£ 360,000 
Kenya Gain £1,110,000 
Uganda Loss £ 810,000 
Over time the divergencies in growth rates and structural dynamic gains 
or losses of product would tend to increase with the increasing relative 
weight of manufacturing. (5) 
NOTES 
1. Includes coffee curing, cotton ginning, sisal decorticating, and 
(except for Kenya) sugar manufacture. 
2. Excludes primary processing listed in Note 1. 
3. This rate rather overstates the relative Tanzanian position. 
The pickup in construction in Tanzania was more advanced for 
1964 than in the other two territories where it remained at 
semi-depressed levels. 
11/. 
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The difference between total gains and losses results from 
rounding in calculation of A and B. 
5. It is not contended that this growth pattern is probable. 
Present plans call for distinctly unequal levels of effort 
and for structural changes. The attempt is to give a rough 
order of magnitude to the dynamic gains and losses resulting 
from the present structure of production and therefore to a 
substantial extent from economic union. 
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